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Swedish minimum wages are not regulated by law, but subject to bargaining between 
employers and trade unions and form part of collective agreements. This paper 
provides an overview of the Swedish minimum wage system, its characteristics and 
effects on employment and wages, and also discusses the challenges to the model 
represented by increasing low-wage competition from new EU member states and the 
verdict in the Laval case, related to this process and the first of its kind in post-
enlargement EU. 
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Introduction 
Minimum wages in Sweden are not regulated by law, but subject to bargaining between 
employers and trade unions and form part of collective agreements. Swedish minimum 
wages are relatively high by international standards and have been increasing 
concurrently with overall real wage growth in the economy since 1995. Minimum 
wages are binding mainly in service sectors, such as hotels and restaurants and retail. In 
those sectors, minimum wages have also increased in relation to average wages.  
The ‘working poor’ phenomenon is not pervasive in the Swedish labour market. 
Most of those with the lowest incomes are out of work and lack income from pensions, 
unemployment insurance or health insurance. These low-income earners are also highly 
dependent on social assistance, which for some households with children may be 
higher than the minimum wage in a service sector job.  
Section 1 of this chapter presents information on minimum wage levels in Sweden 
and their relation to wages in general and minimum wages in other countries. 
Section 2 discusses the effects of minimum wages on low pay and employment. 
Minimum wages have served to push up the lowest wages in hotels and restaurants and 
retail, and in the former also seem to have generated negative employment effects. In 
other sectors of the labour market, the impact of minimum wages on the wage structure 
and employment is likely to be small.  
In Section 3, the sustainability of the Swedish model, with no government 
involvement in minimum wage setting, is discussed against the background of 
increasing competition from low-wage countries. The accession to the European Union 
of new member states from Central and Eastern Europe seems to pose specific 
challenges to systems with collectively agreed minimum wages in the old member 
states. An example of this is that firms operating temporarily with their own personnel 
in other EU countries should, according to the Posted Workers Directive of 1996, 
adhere to the minimum wage legislation of the host country. However, Sweden has no 
statutory minimum wages, nor are the rates in collective agreements legally extended to 
uncovered sectors. Since the accession of the new member states in 2004 the number of 
posted workers seems to have increased considerably, in particular from Poland and the 
Baltic countries, but the available statistics are incomplete.  
The issue of posted workers has been highlighted by the labour dispute in the 
European Court of Justice between the Latvian company Laval un Partneri and 
Swedish trade unions that put the company under blockade, and subsequently out of 
business. On 18 December 2007, the court announced its judgment in the Laval case – 
or the Vaxholm case, as it is also known in Sweden – which has gained considerable 
attention as the first of its kind in the post-enlargement EU. The court ruled against the 
Swedish construction workers trade union, a decision based on the absence of clearly 
defined minimum wages in the host country and the fact that union action was taken 
against a firm with a collective agreement in the country of origin.  
It remains to be seen what the full implications of the Laval case will be for 
minimum wage setting in Sweden, but it is likely that modifications of some sort will 
be made. Up to now, the impact on the Swedish labour market of the inflow of posted 
workers seems to have been limited (as the regional analysis of wages in construction 
shows), but this may change if the inflow continues to increase and spreads to other 
sectors previously shielded from international competition, such as services.  
 
1. Fixing mechanisms and coverage 
 
In collective agreements, contractual wage increases, as well as minimum wage levels, 
are negotiated for various worker categories. In 2007, around 280 collective 
agreements were signed, most of which contained clauses regarding (differentiated) 
minimum wages (National Mediation Office 2008). In 2006, 35 agreements were 
concluded (National Mediation Office 2007). Some agreements for non-manual    2 
workers, especially professionals, do not contain minimum rates, as much of the wage 
formation is decentralised to the local level.  
The agreement period is typically more than one year, 2–3 years is the usual length. 
This means that annual increases in minimum wages are negotiated for some years in 
advance, which helps employers adjust to future minimum wage levels. Within each 
agreement minimum wages are, or have been, laid down in accordance with the 
number of workers and workplace characteristics, such as occupation, age, work 
experience, type of employment contract and location. Agreements apply to all firms 
that are members of a signatory employer association in the industry, whether the 
workers are unionised or not. Approximately 90 per cent of all workers are covered by 
collective agreements. In general, minimum wages are specific to the negotiating area 
and nationwide.  
On top of the contractual wage increases, there is also wage drift, that is, locally 
negotiated wage increases. Like the contractual wage increases, minimum wages are 
typically not subject to local bargaining.
1 The minimum rates are defined as SEK per 
hour or month for various categories of workers, depending on negotiating area.  
The minimum wages, although differentiated to a large extent, effectively function 
as wage floors on the labour market. During the 1990s, the tariff wage system in the 
nationwide agreements was largely abandoned in favour of local and more 
individualised wage formation. At present, less than 10 per cent of all employees are 
covered by tariff wages (Lindström 2008).  
Minimum wages in all Nordic countries are set in collective agreements (see Table 
1). Differentiation of rates is widely used in all countries. Finland – and to a much 
lesser extent Norway – extends the rates in the agreements to uncovered sectors. In 
Finland, extension is possible if the collective agreement is ‘representative’, which is 
assessed by a specific institution, the Board for Ratification of the Validity of 
Collective Agreements, and by the Labour Court. They have considered a contract to 
be representative when at least half of the workers in the industry are union members 
and most industries have a representative contract (Böckerman and Uusitalo 2007). In 
Norway, extensions have been few, however, and used mainly in the construction 
sector. Denmark is the country that resembles Sweden the most as it relies solely on 
collective agreements for the determination of minimum wages.  
Since the collective agreements in the Nordic countries tend to also cover most 
workers with atypical employment, like fixed-term and part-time jobs as well as 
employment in temporary work agencies, few workers are excluded from the minimum 
rates. However, like in most other countries, self-employed workers are not covered.   
Due to the complexity of the minimum wage systems in the Nordic countries and 
the absence of legislation, very little systematic information is readily available on the 
rates and their evolution over time.
2 Consequently, there is virtually no information at 
all regarding the overall percentage of workers on the minimum wages, wage mobility 
of minimum wage workers and other important characteristics of the minimum wage 
systems, although the share of low-paid workers in general seems to be relatively low 
in all Nordic countries.  
 
 
                                                 
1 An exception is the agreements for certain occupations among local government employees, where 
minimum wages may differ by municipality. 
2 In Sweden, the National Mediation Office started publishing information about the latest negotiated 
minimum wages in their annual report for 2005 (National Mediation Office 2006). To the best of my 
knowledge, there is nothing similar in the other Nordic countries.       3 
Table 1: Regulation of minimum wages in the Nordic countries 
 
  Denmark   Finland  Norway   Sweden 
 
Fixing  mechanism  Collective Collective Collective Collective 
 agreements  agreements  agreements agreements 
 
Differentiation by: 
 age  (excluding  minors)  No  No  Yes  Yes 
  industry    Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 experience  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 occupation  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
  region    No Yes  No No 
 
Legal extension to 
 uncovered  sectors  No Yes  Yes  No 
       (but  little 
       used)   
Coverage of collective 




Note: Information on differentiation is based on collective agreements for three sectors in 2006: 
Construction, hotels and restaurants and retail. Coverage of collective agreements refers to private sector only 
(except for Finland).  
 
Source: Collective agreements, Fahlbeck (2006). 
 
 
The high coverage of collective agreements in the Nordic labour markets, ranging 
between 70 and 90 per cent, is probably an important explanation for why minimum 
rates have been determined in negotiations between unions and employers and not 
through a legislated national minimum wage. Even more relevant would perhaps be the 
coverage rates in low-wage industries. EIRO (2005) reports rates between 55 and 100 
per cent in retail and hotels/restaurants for Finland, Norway and Sweden. Since most 
workers are covered by the minimum rates, also in low-wage industries, legislation has 
not been regarded as necessary.    
Negotiated minimum wages are not unique to the Nordic countries, however. In 
some countries with statutory rates, like France, Netherlands and Spain, minimum 
wages are also negotiated in collective agreements.  What sets the Nordic countries, 
and especially Sweden, apart is instead the fact that the legal possibilities for unions to 
enforce and impose collective agreements are relatively far-reaching. The blockade 
undertaken by Swedish unions against the Laval company is a case in point (to which 
we will return in Section 4.1). Legislation regarding sympathetic actions, of unions not 
directly involved in a conflict, seems to be less restrictive in the Nordic countries than 
elsewhere and requirements of ‘proportionality’ of union actions are especially lenient 
in Sweden (Fahlbeck 2006). In addition, the high unionisation rates in the Nordic 
countries seem to be largely explained by the Ghent system, which is used in Denmark, 
Finland and Sweden and ties eligibility for unemployment insurance benefits to union 




2. Minimum wage developments  
Due to the large number of collective agreements, the description in this section 
focuses on seven agreements for manual workers, namely the ‘Engineering Agreement’ 
(Teknikavtalet Metall, formerly Verkstadsavtalet), the ‘Construction Agreement’    4 
(Byggnadsavtalet), the ‘Slaughterhouse Agreement’ (Slakteri- och charkuteriavtalet), 
the ‘Bakery Agreement’ (Bageriavtalet), the ‘Retail Trade Agreement’ 
(Detaljhandelsavtalet), the ‘Hotels and Restaurants Agreement’ (Hotell- och 
restaurangavtalet) and the ‘Local Government Agreement’ (Kommunalavtalet). The 
selected agreements include negotiating areas for both manufacturing and service 
industries, both private and public sectors, as well as some of the largest agreements on 
the Swedish labour market. The six unions that are signatories of the seven agreements 
had 1,227,000 members in 2002 (Kjellberg 2003), which amounts to 74 per cent of the 
total membership of the Swedish Confederation of Trade Unions 
(Landsorganisationen, LO).
3 
The basic period of study is 1995–2007. The presentation is based on a 
‘standardised worker’ in order to achieve comparability of minimum rates across 
agreements and years. The characteristics of the standardised worker are as follows: at 
least 20 years of age, with no work experience and working in an unskilled occupation 
in a non-metropolitan area. A worker with these characteristics is expected to have the 
lowest minimum wage for an adult worker in each agreement.  
The evolution of minimum rates for the standardised worker is described in nominal 
and real terms, as well as in relation to average wages (a measure known as the 
‘minimum wage bite’ or the ‘Kaitz index’). In addition, the degree of differentiation of 
minimum wages (in relation to the standardised worker) is shown, with respect to age.  
 
2.1 Minimum wages and the minimum wage bite 
 
Figure 1 shows the nominal minimum wage per hour for the standardised worker in the 
selected agreements during 1995–2009. Since the agreements typically specify 
minimum wages for a two- or three-year period, it is possible to include future levels. 
In general, minimum wage levels are lower in services than in other sectors. In 2007, 
minimum wages ranged from SEK 102.48 (€11.08) in the bakery sector to SEK 79.77 
(€8.62) in local government. The Local Government Agreement specifies only monthly 
minimum wages (SEK 13,800 in 2007) and these have been recalculated to hourly 
rates.
4  
Minimum wages have increased at fairly stable rates, with some exceptions in the 
latest agreements: bakery and slaughterhouse (unusually high percentage increases in 
2007) and local government (unusually high in 2009). In the two former agreements, 
this is explained by a change in the structure of the agreements; up to and including 
2006, minimum wages were differentiated by type of contract (permanent or fixed-
term). This differentiation entailed a lower minimum for permanent employees during 
the first year of employment. In the latest local government agreement, minimum 
wages have not been adjusted in the first two years but have instead increased more 
substantially in the third year.  
 
                                                 
3 The Food Workers’ Union (Livsmedelsarbetareförbundet) is signatory to both the Slaughterhouse 
Agreement and the Bakery Agreement. 
4 Many workers who are affected by the Local Government Agreement work fewer than 40 hours per week 
and also have additional holidays (Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions 2005). Hence the 
recalculation to an hourly wage is likely to understate the minimum wage in this agreement as compared to 
the other agreements in this chapter.    5 
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Engineering Bakery Slaughter-house Construction
Source: Collective agreements. 
 
 











1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Retail Hotels & restaurants Local Government
 
Source: See Figure 1.a. 
 
 
Real minimum wages, in 2007 prices, are displayed in Figure 2. The minimum rates 
are deflated with the consumer price index and reflect the purchasing power before 
taxes for a standardised worker on the lowest rate during 1995–2009.
5 The real rates 
have increased considerably in all agreements from 1995 to 2007 and are likely to 
continue to rise in 2008–9, despite an increase in the expected inflation rate. In hotels 
                                                 
5 Prices for 2008–9 are based on forecasts by the National Institute for Economic Research.    6 
and restaurants and retail, real minimum wages increased by 49 and 44 per cent, 
respectively, between 1995 and 2007. The lowest increase occurred in the local 
government sector, at 20 per cent. The increases in real minimum wages in the recent 
decade stand in sharp contrast to the period from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s, 
when real rates were either stable or decreased somewhat (Skedinger 2005). 
 











1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Engineering Bakery Slaughter‐house Construction
 
Note: 2007 prices.  
 
Source: Collective agreements (minimum wages), Statistics Sweden (prices) and National Institute for 
Economic Research (price forecasts for 2008–09). 
 
 














Notes and sources: See Figure 2.a. 
 
    7 
 
In the selected agreements, the criteria used for differentiation of minimum wages 
for adult workers included occupation, experience, age, type of contract and location 
over the period 1995–2006 (Skedinger 2005). The most common criterion is 
experience, which is used in all seven agreements at present, and occupation, which is 
used in all agreements except that of retail. Experience is defined in somewhat different 
ways in the agreements: sector- or occupation-specific experience or tenure on the 
present job.  
Differentiation by occupation tends to be based on grouping of occupations, 
according to required responsibility and skill levels. A typical example is the 
Engineering Agreement, where four occupational groups have been used since 1983. 
Group 1 includes ‘jobs that require insignificant or little effort in a fairly good work 
environment and are performed according to detailed instructions and routines’. Group 
4 includes ‘skilled jobs with great demands on judgement, responsibility’.  
As far as the use of differentiation by age is concerned, the picture is mixed. This 
type of differentiation has not been used at all in some agreements, and has been used 
throughout the period in others. To the extent that differentiation has been used, it has 
been limited mainly to two groups – workers over and under 19 years of age.
6 Figure 3 
shows differentiation of minimum wages by age. The minimum wage for an 18 year 
old is contrasted to the minimum wage for the standardised worker, who is 20 years 
old. Construction displays the largest degree of differentiation, with a relative 
minimum for 18 year olds of 71 per cent since 1997. Differentiation by age in retail is 
relatively modest, while the hotels and restaurants sector has displayed a downward 
trend since 2004. In local government, agreements since 2002 do not specify minimum 
wages for workers below 19 years of age.  
 
 






























Note: Minimum wages of 18-year-olds in relation to 20-year-olds.  
 
Source: Collective agreements. 
 
 
                                                 
6 Differentiation by age for minors – that is, workers below the age of 18 – is not considered. Such 
differentiation is used in most of the selected agreements.     8 
A notable development occurred in the Hotels and Restaurants Agreement in 1993 
(to which we will return when discussing the employment effects of minimum wages in 
Section 3.2). In that year, differentiation by age increased markedly as the minimum 
wage for 18 year olds was reduced to SEK 44.90 per hour, from SEK 51.90 the 
previous year, at the same time as the minimum for 20 year olds increased to SEK 
52.85. This is an example of a nominal (minimum) wage reduction, which is extremely 
rare in collective agreements in Sweden and should be seen against the background of 
rapidly increasing unemployment in the first half of the 1990s. 
In general, there is a trend towards more differentiation by experience and age since 
the 1980s, while the picture is more diverse regarding differentiation by occupation 
(Skedinger 2005). The first observation is well in line with the studies pointing to more 
wage dispersion in general since the early 1980s (Edin and Holmlund 1995). A 
possible explanation of the second observation, regarding differentiation by occupation, 
is that skill requirements have increased in certain industries, such as engineering and 
construction, while the distinction between different occupations has become more 
blurred in other sectors.  
Figure 4 relates the minimum wage for the standardised worker to average wages 
for manual workers in the corresponding industry for the period 1995–2006.
7 The 
highest minimum wage bite in 2006, 87 per cent, is in hotels and restaurants, while 
construction and engineering exhibit the lowest, at 58 and 62 per cent, respectively. It 
is thus to be expected that more workers are affected by minimum wages in sectors  
such as and hotels and restaurants than in other sectors. The role of the minimum wage 
is thus sector-specific to a large extent, since minimum rates are not likely to be 
binding  in all sectors. 
 
 











1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Engineering Bakery Slaughter‐house Construction
 
Note: Minimum wages in relation to average wages in the industry. 
 
Source: Collective agreements (minimum wages), Statistics Sweden (average wages). 
                                                 
7 The industries in the data on average wages do not in all cases correspond exactly to the industries in the 
agreements. For example, data are not available for average wages in bakeries and slaughterhouses, so data 
for the food industry as a whole have been used.     9 
 
 















 Note and source: See figure 4.a. 
 
 
There is some variation across agreements in the development of the bite over time 
in Figure 4; in hotels and restaurants and retail there is a marked increase, especially 
since 2000, while the bite has decreased in slaughterhouses, engineering and local 
government. The increases in the bite are, however, smaller than the increases in real 
minimum wages (Figure 2).  
The development of real wages in the whole economy is shown in Figure 5 (figures 
are available only for monthly wages). Average wages increased from SEK 18,200 in 
1995 to 25,600 in 2006, which represents a 40 per cent increase. Median wages 
increased at a slightly lower rate, 36 per cent, which suggests that wage growth has 
been relatively stronger in the upper part of the wage distribution. It is thus clear that 
the minimum wage developments in the selected agreements, noted in Figure 3, are 
part of an overall wage growth in the economy. This development stands in sharp 
contrast to the period 1975–95, during which real wage growth was zero (Edin and 
Topel 1997). A major factor behind the wage developments since 1995 is a sustained 
rise in productivity over the period.  
Figure 6 relates minimum wages in hotels and restaurants and retail to monthly 
wages in the whole economy. Monthly minimum wages for the standardised worker in 
hotels and restaurants are higher than in retail, despite the fact that hourly wages in the 
former sector are relatively lower (as seen in Figures 1–2). Over the period as a whole, 
the bite increased in relation to median monthly wages, while little changed relative to 
the average.     10











1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Average Median
 
Note: 2007 prices.  
 
Source: Statistics Sweden. 
 
 
Figure 6: Minimum wages in relation to wages (average and median) in the whole 







1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Average,retail Median, retail
Average, hotels & rest.  Median, hotels & rest.
  
 
Source: Collective agreements (minimum wages), Statistics Sweden (wages). 
 
 
How do Swedish minimum wages relate to those of her neighbours? Table 2 shows 
hourly minimum rates in the collective agreements for construction, retail and hotels 
and restaurants in Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden in 2006.
8 As in previous 
figures, the rates pertain to 20-year-old, unskilled workers with no previous experience 
                                                 
8 Most agreements also specify monthly minimum wages, but these are not directly comparable across 
countries due to national differences in stipulated weekly working hours.    11 
(construction workers, shop assistants and restaurant assistants, respectively). The 
highest minimum wages levels are in Denmark and Norway and the lowest in Finland. 
The ranking across countries corresponds fairly well to what would be expected from 
the differences in the economy-wide wage levels.  In relation to average wages for 
production workers in manufacturing, minimum wages in Denmark and Norway seem 
to be at about the same levels as in Sweden. The bite in Finland is, however, 
consistently lower than in the other Nordic countries. Whether this has something to do 
with the special features of the Finnish minimum wage system, such as the reliance on 
extension of agreements to non-covered sectors, or is explained by other factors 
remains an open question.   
 
 
Table 2: Hourly minimum wages in the Nordic countries, 2006 
 




 currencies  96.15  7.60  118.00  78.40 
Euros 12.89  7.60  14.67  8.48 
% of average  
  wage in  
 manufac.  51 40 56 50 
Retail 
National  
 currencies  93.93 8.32  101.67  87.44 
Euros  12.60 8.32  12.64 9.45 
% of average  
  wage in  
  manufac.  50   44   48   56 
Hotels and restaurants 
National  
 currencies  100.24  8.36   111.98   86.75 
Euros  13.44   8.36   13.91   9.38 
% of average  
  wage in  
  manufac.  53   44   53   55 
 
Note: Average wages for production workers. 
 
Source: Collective agreements (minimum wages, kindly provided by Petri Böckerman for Finland), US 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (manufacturing wages). 
 
 
The Swedish minimum wages for adult manual workers, as a percentage of median 
wages in manufacturing, ranged from 60 to 72 per cent in 2004, depending on 
agreement (Skedinger 2005). This places Sweden in the top position  in relation  to  
countries with statutory minimum wages for which comparable data have been 
compiled (Low Pay Commission 2005). . Judging from Table 2, the other Nordic 
countries are likely to also rank high in this respect.   
 
2.2 Incidence of low pay and poverty  
 
Figures from Konjunkturinstitutet, the National Institute for Economic Research 
(2007), reveal that in 2006 about 30 per cent of workers in hotels and restaurants were 
on or close to – that is, at most 1 per cent above – one of the six minimum wage levels    12
defined in the agreement. The corresponding figures for retail were 20 per cent (four 
minimum wage levels). Only a few per cent of workers in local government and 
engineering turned out to be on or close to the minimum wages. The percentage of 
workers affected by the very lowest adult rate (for the standardised worker) is not 
known, but is likely to be considerably lower. No information is available for 
construction, bakeries and slaughterhouses, but few workers are probably on or close to 
the minimum wages in these agreements.  
The incidence of low pay in general in Sweden is presented in Table 3. The figures 
are based on two different data sources, Wage Statistics (Lönestrukturstatistiken) and 
the Income Distribution Surveys (Inkomstfördelningsundersökningen).  The former 
source is based on payroll records and covers all employees, while the data from the 
latter are limited to full-time, full-year employees, and based on register information 
supplemented with interviews. Wages  in the former source have been recalculated to 
full-time equivalents. The table shows that few workers are low paid according to both 
sources. In the Income Distribution Surveys, about 15 per cent of employees are paid 
below two thirds of the average monthly wage and 6–9 per cent are paid below two 
thirds of the median The corresponding figures are even lower in the Wage Statistics, 7 
percent and 1.5 per cent, respectively.
9  
The table also shows the proportion of workers who, according to the Wage 
Statistics, are on or slightly above (within a 1 per cent interval) the equivalent of the 
minimum wages in hotels and restaurants and retail, respectively. These proportions 
range between 0.2 and 0.4 per cent. Few workers are paid below these minimum rates, 
although there is an increase in both proportions over the period 2004–06. The table 
makes it clear that the ‘working poor’ phenomenon is not pervasive in the Swedish 
labour market. People with the lowest incomes tend to be out of work, lack income 
from pensions, unemployment insurance or health insurance and to be dependent on 
social assistance (Gustafsson et al. 2007).  
 
 
Table 3: Incidence of low pay among employees, 2004–06 (%) 
 
  2004   2005   2006 
 
Income Distribution Surveys: 
   Below 2/3 of average wage   14.1   14.5   15.5 
   Below 2/3 of median wage  6.4   7.1   8.7 
 
Wage Statistics: 
   Below 2/3 of average wage   6.8   6.8   7.0 
   Below 2/3 of median wage  1.3   1.4   1.6 
   On hotels and rest. minimum wage  0.4   0.3   0.3 
   Below hotels and rest. minimum wage   1.3   1.5   2.2 
 
   On retail minimum wage  0.2   0.2   0.2 
   Below retail minimum wage   0.8   0.9   1.3 
 
 
Note: All wage measures are monthly. The wage statistics are based on all employees, while the income 
distribution survey statistics are based on full-time, full-year employees.  Being on a minimum wage is 
                                                 
9 The large difference between the two sources is not easily explained. It is conceivable that systematic 
measurement errors are introduced in the Income Distribution Surveys when using self-reported working 
hours. Another factor contributing to the difference may be that the Surveys include sickness benefits and 
parents’ allowances, which in general are lower than the wage. The Wage Statistics are based on the regular 
wage only.      13 
defined as having a wage that is at least as high as the equivalent to the minimum wage but lower than the 
equivalent to the minimum wage x 1.01, regardless of occupation and industry.  
 
Source: Wage Statistics: Own calculations based on data from Statistics Sweden and collective agreements. 
Income Distribution Surveys: Calculations kindly provided by Kjell Jansson, Statistics Sweden. 
 
 
It is of some interest to relate the minimum wage levels in the collective agreements 
to an absolute measure of poverty, namely the Swedish ‘poverty line’. Unlike in the 
United States and some other countries, there is no official measure of the poverty line 
in Sweden. However, the National Board of Health and Welfare (Socialstyrelsen) 
publishes guidelines for social assistance that specify a ‘social assistance level’ 
(biståndsnivå) for various household categories.
10  
Figure 7 relates real monthly social assistance levels for a single-adult household in 
the city of Stockholm, with and without children, to real monthly minimum wages in 
hotels and restaurants and retail. Social assistance levels and minimum wages are 
calculated net of income taxes, assuming full-time work. The social assistance 
beneficiary in the figure is assumed to be employed, in which case the assistance level 
includes work-related costs, such as union fees and costs for day care and transport to 
work. Minimum wages in the two sectors have increased at a faster rate than social 
assistance, but are still below the social assistance level for a single-parent household 
with two children and close to the level with one child. This could create ‘poverty 
traps’ for some households with children to the extent that it does not pay to take up a 
minimum wage job in relation to receiving social assistance. In order to increase labour 
supply incentives in general, the government introduced  tax credits for earned income 
in 2007. The effect of the reform is seen in the figure as a notable increase in after-tax 
minimum wages in relation to social assistance levels.  
 
Figure 7: Real social assistance levels (SA) and real minimum wages (MW), city of 








1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
SA: Without children SA: 1 child SA: 2 children
Retail Hotels & rest.
 
Note: 2005 prices. Social assistance refers to a single-adult household.  
Source: Collective agreements (minimum wages), calculations by courtesy of Kjell Jansson, Statistics 
Sweden (social assistance). 
 
 
                                                 
10 The municipalities, who are responsible for providing social assistance, are free to apply more generous 
standards. An individual assessment is always made of the overall economic situation of the household and 
incomes below the social assistance level do not guarantee financial support from the municipalities.    14
A poverty measure sometimes used in Sweden is the number of long-term recipients 
(10–12 months per annum) of social assistance, aged 18 or over. According to the 
National Board of Health and Welfare, this number decreased from about 120,000 to 
around 80,000 during the period 1995–2006. Around half of these recipients are either 
foreign-born or have been unemployed without receiving unemployment insurance 
benefits during the year.  
 
2.3 Wage and income dispersion  
 
What about income and wage dispersion in general in Sweden? Figure 8 shows the 
Gini coefficient for disposable income during the period 1995–2005. Although the Gini 
is low by international standards, it increased somewhat over the period, from 0.23 to 
0.27. According to Figure 9, which shows the ratio of monthly wages in the 90th to the 
10th percentile, top wages rose in relation to low wages during the same period. The 
figure hides important differences across worker groups and sectors. Top wages have 
increased most rapidly among non-manual workers in the private sector (National 
Institute for Economic Research 2007). Among manual workers in the same sector, the 
P90/P10 ratio has not changed much.  
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Source: Statistics Sweden, Income Distribution Surveys. 
 
A development towards greater wage dispersion has been observed also in many 
other countries, especially the United States and the United Kingdom. The underlying, 
and interacting, factors can be divided into those that affect the demand for labour, the 
supply of labour and institutional factors (see, for example, Katz and Autor 1999). 
Globalisation in the form of increased trade with low-income countries and 
technological development has changed demand in favour of skilled workers. Supply 
factors depend mainly on the educational level of the labour force, but migration may 
become increasingly important in the enlarged EU.     15 
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Source: Statistics Sweden, Wage Statistics. 
 
 
An institutional factor of particular relevance in the Swedish context is the tendency 
towards less centralised wage formation since the 1980s. While membership of manual 
workers’ unions (LO) has decreased over time, unions for non-manual workers, the 
Swedish Confederation for Professional Employees (Tjänstemännens 
Centralorganisation, TCO) and the Swedish Confederation of Professional 
Associations ( Sveriges Akademikers Centralorganisation, SACO), have grown to 
approach LO in total membership. The wage policies of the two latter organisations 
differ from LO’s, in terms of being less aimed at wage compression. For example, 
unlike the LO agreements, many agreements for non-manual workers do not contain 
any clauses regarding minimum wages. According to the National Institute for 
Economic Research (2007), wage dispersion in the lower half of the distribution 
(P50/P10) increased in all sectors except for manual workers in the private sector 
during 1996–2006. Furthermore, wage dispersion is greater and has increased more in 
highly decentralised agreements, with more local wage formation. Decentralisation has 
been most pronounced in agreements for central government employees and non-
manual workers, and least so for manual workers in the private sector.  
Another development is that wage dispersion between establishments has increased, 
which may be explained by the shifts towards local wage formation in some sectors 
(Nordström Skans et al. 2006). Under local bargaining, firm profitability is more likely 
to have an influence on wage differentials.  
 
3. Minimum wage effects  
 
This section considers the effects of minimum wages on the wage structure and 
employment. Since minimum wages seem to be binding only in two sectors, hotels and 
restaurants and retail, effects are likely to be concentrated there. This section also 
considers studies of minimum wage effects in other Nordic countries, where available.  
 
3.1 Specific effects from collectively agreed minimum wages 
 
Very little research seems to have been carried out on the effects of collectively agreed 
minimum wages in general. This stands in sharp contrast to the vast research output for 
countries with statutory rates. In a recent survey of the ‘new minimum wage research’    16
since the early 1990s, only one of 102 cited works dealing with employment effects 
originates from a country with collectively agreed minimum wages (Neumark and 
Wascher 2007).  
Some researchers have argued that negotiated rates, since they are applied 
voluntarily by employers, should be associated with only mild employment effects 
(see, for example, Bazen 2000). It has also been pointed out that it is possible that 
unions and employers have a good sense of what constitutes a relevant market wage for 
unskilled workers and use this information to set minimum wages that are associated 
with weak distortionary effects on the labour market (Neumark and Wascher 2004). 
Others have put forward the hypothesis that unions in European countries use increases 
in the minimum wage as a launch pad for their wage demands, leading to a larger wage 
spillover effect and a more adverse effect of the minimum wage on employment than in 
the United States (Dolado et al. 2000). Since workers move up the wage scale with age 
and tenure under collectively agreed minimum wages, spillovers may be even larger in 
such systems. Neumark and Wascher (2004) argue that the presence of unions in the 
negotiating process may result in a higher minimum wage than otherwise, which could 
affect employment adversely. It thus seems to be an empirical issue whether 
employment effects are more adverse or not with collectively agreed minimum wages.  
It is not easy to assess the influence of collectively agreed minimum wages on the 
functioning of the labour market. Not only are such systems highly complex, as shown 
in this chapter, but collectively agreed rates also tend to co-exist with other institutions, 
such as strong reliance on active labour market policies and stringent labour standards 
regarding work hours and work rules, which are also likely to affect the workings of 
the labour market.  
 
3.2 Effects on wage dispersion  
 
Wage dispersion in the lower half of the distribution (P50/P10) decreased somewhat in 
the Hotels and Restaurants Agreement, from 1.18 in 1996 to 1.15 in 2006 (National 
Institute for Economic Research, 2007). This could be due to the increase in the 
minimum wage bite in this sector. Wage dispersion according to this measure has 
remained stable in retail and in local government.  
A detailed examination of wage distributions in the various agreements in 2006 
reveals that the effects of minimum wages seem to be present mainly in hotels and 
restaurants and retail (National Institute for Economic Research 2007). The wage 
distribution in the Engineering Agreement is shaped almost like a normal, single-
peaked distribution. In contrast, the wage distributions in the two service sectors 
display marked spikes at the different minimum wage levels. Local government is an 
intermediate case, with smaller spikes at the two minimum wage levels in that 
agreement but otherwise a shape similar to engineering. Judging from the wage 
distributions, minimum wage regulation seems to have pushed up the lowest wages for 
workers in hotels and restaurants and retail, but not to have had much effect in other 
agreements for which data are available. 
What about spillover effects? With increasing minimum wages, say, firms may wish 
to substitute workers with higher marginal productivity for lower-productivity workers, 
thereby increasing demand and wages for the former, high-skilled group of employees. 
There may also be a ripple effect if high-wage workers increase their wage claims in 
order to restore wage differentials, when concerns about relative wages matter in wage 
formation. The analysis carried out by the National Institute for Economic Research 
(2007) suggests that increases of minimum wages in local government and 
hotels/restaurants have been associated with wage increases for all workers, but not as 
large (in percentage terms) as the minimum wage increases.  .  
Effects of minimum wages on wage distribution have also been analysed more 
formally by Edin and Holmlund (1994) and Östros (1994). Data aggregated by industry    17 
(for manual workers in the engineering, sawmills, paper and wood industries and for 
non-manual workers in mining and manufacturing) are used for the period 1971–92. 
The two studies examine the extent to which increasing minimum wages have 
contributed to the increasing relative wages for young workers that have been observed 
(especially during the first half of the 1970s). The results suggest that both increasing 
minimum wages and lower labour supply of young workers – that is, the size of the 
population cohorts – have contributed to increasing wages for this group. The effects of 
minimum wages are larger for manual than for non-manual workers; the wage 
elasticities, which are dependent on age group, are 0.6 and 0.05–0.2, respectively. This 
means that a 10 per cent hike in the minimum wage increases wages by 6 per cent for 
manuals and 0.5–2 per cent for non-manuals.  
All in all, the empirical evidence clearly indicates that minimum wages affect and 
compress the bottom part of the wage distributions in retail and hotels/restaurants. 
Effects on wage distributions in other sectors are probably less pronounced. Relatively 
little is known about spillover effects further up in the wage distributions.  
 
3.2 Effects on employment  
 
Skedinger (2006) analyses employment effects of minimum wage rates in hotels and 
restaurants during 1979–98. As demonstrated in Figure 2, this is the industry with the 
highest minimum wage bite in Sweden (86 per cent in 2006). So, if any adverse 
employment effects of minimum wages exist, they are likely to show up here. In the 
analysis, the approach in Abowd (2000a, 2000b) and Kramarz and Philippon (2001) is 
used and modified. This approach utilises a ‘natural experiment’, based on the position 
of individual workers in the wage distribution. Employment outcomes in a ‘risk group’ 
that is potentially affected by minimum wage changes – individuals with a wage near 
the minimum – are compared to outcomes for a control group.
11 A distinction is made 
between the possibility of an increased outflow from employment due to real minimum 
wage increases (between two consecutive years) and the possibility of an increased 
inflow because of real minimum wage decreases. The two flows are not necessarily 
symmetric.  
The results in Skedinger (2006) indicate that real minimum wage increases are 
associated with an increased probability of job separations, relative to the control 
group. To a certain extent, the probability of job accessions also increases when real 
minimum wages decrease. The estimated effects are relatively large; an increase of the 
minimum wage by 10 per cent tends to decrease the employment probability in the risk 
group by about 5 per cent.
12 As minimum wages are more binding in hotels and 
restaurants than in other industries, these results may represent an upper bound of the 
employment effects in Sweden. Another notable result in the study is that no 
employment effect is found for teenagers (aged 18–19) during the period 1993–98. A 
possible explanation of this finding is the introduction of age-differentiated minimum 
rates in 1993 (as discussed in Section 2.1). This change in the design of the minimum 
wage system reduced the rates for teenagers in the industry considerably.  
                                                 
11 The control group is defined as employees with the same minimum wage as the risk group and wages 
within an interval just above the wages of the risk group (as in Abowd 2000a, 2000b and Kramarz and 
Philippon 2001), and alternatively as a group within the same wage interval as the risk group, but with a 
lower minimum wage. The latter approach is feasible due to the differentiation of minimum wages. 
12 It should be noted that the implied elasticity (–0.5) is conditional on previous employment and is thus not 
directly comparable to the unconditional elasticities that are typically estimated in the literature. However, 
conditional elasticities may be of specific interest since they concern the individuals who are most likely to 
be affected by minimum wages.     18
Results in Edin and Holmlund (1994) also point to negative employment effects of 
minimum wages. The study uses data aggregated by industry and concerns 18 year old 
workers in manufacturing during 1972–91.  
There are few studies examining employment effects of collectively agreed 
minimum wages in other Nordic countries and the results are mixed. Böckerman and 
Uusitalo (2007) examine the effects of temporary exceptions to minimum wage 
regulations in Finland in 1993–95 and find that they had no employment-increasing  
effects in the retail sector. Apparently, few employers used the opportunity to pay sub-
minimum wages to young workers made possible by the exceptions. Askildsen et al. 
(2000) report small effects on transitions from employment to unemployment from 
increased minimum wages in Norway during the period 1991–95. For Denmark, Albæk 
and Strøjer Madsen (1987) find negative employment effects of minimum wage 
increases in the late 1970s.  
A conclusion from the empirical evidence is that there is a risk of negative effects 
on employment of unskilled workers if the minimum wage level is set “too high”. It is, 
however, difficult to pinpoint exactly where this level lies from existing research. 
While not all studies indicate negative effects, there is no study that suggests that 
minimum wages have positive effects on employment (in consistence with monopsony 
theories that emphasise the role of search frictions and mobility costs on the labour 
market). This does not rule out that minimum wages could have positive effects on 
other outcomes, like training and worker productivity, but so far there is no evidence 
available that could shed light on these issues. 
 
 
4. Case studies  
The public debate on minimum wage issues has been rather limited in Sweden. The 
likely explanation is that minimum wages are collectively agreed and thus determined 
outside the political system. Minimum wages are rarely on the political agenda, in 
contrast to many countries with statutory minimum rates. However, in the aftermath of 
the Laval case, this seems to be changing. The purpose of this section is to discuss the 
Laval case and assess its implications for wage and minimum wage formation in 
Sweden, in the form of two ‘case studies’. The first case study deals with the reactions 
of the government, unions and employers in the Laval case. Our second case study 
considers labour migration from the new EU member states to Sweden and its 
consequences for wages in the construction sector.  
 
4.1 Case study 1: The turmoil provoked by the Laval case 
 
The European Court of Justice decision 
 
On 18 December 2007 the European Court of Justice announced its judgment in the 
Laval case, which has gained considerable attention as the first of its kind in the post-
enlargement EU. The case concerned a labour dispute between the Latvian company 
Laval un Partneri and Swedish trade unions that put the company under blockade, and 
subsequently out of business. The company posted Latvian construction workers for a 
school building project to the town of Vaxholm in 2004.The court ruled against the 
Swedish Construction Workers’ Union., a decision that was based on the absence of 
clearly defined minimum wages in the host country and the fact that union action was 
taken against a firm with a collective agreement in the country of origin. According to 
the court, wage rates must be predictable for foreign companies and it will thus not be 
possible to negotiate these rates for posted workers on a case-by-case basis at the firm 
level, as the Swedish union wished to do with Laval, in the future. 
Under the Posted Workers Directive, which came into force in 1996 and applies to 
all EU and EES countries, firms from member countries temporarily operating in    19 
another member country should not pay wages below the legal minimum wage in the 
host country. However, Sweden neither has a legal minimum nor legally extends 




The immediate reaction by the Swedish government to the court’s ruling was to initiate 
the preparation of an official report that should form the basis for a bill presented to the 
Riksdag in spring 2009. The commission, which should present its report no later than 
15 December 2008, has been instructed to come up with suggestions on how to 
preserve the basic structure of the Swedish model of labour market relations without 
this coming into conflict with EU law.  
The adjustments in the Swedish model of minimum wage setting could be relatively 
minor or involve a transition to statutory minimum wages or legal extension of the 
rates in the agreements to uncovered sectors, as has been done already in Finland and, 
to a lesser extent, in Norway. Sweden and Denmark do not extend collective 
agreements to uncovered sectors, so these countries continue to rely on collective 
agreements only for minimum wage setting. The Nordic countries have thus adopted 
somewhat different strategies so far in regulating minimum wages for posted workers. 
 
Standpoints and actions taken by unions and employer organisations 
 
Unions and some employer organisations in Sweden have expressed an opinion on how 
to deal with the Laval verdict with regard to minimum wages.  
All unions, irrespective of the type of labour they organise, are critical of the verdict 
and have taken a position against both statutory minimum wages and legal extension to 
uncovered sectors. One likely explanation of this stance is that a legal minimum wage 
would be lower than the collectively agreed rates and would also not be differentiated 
by industry. Another reason may be that, although legal extension would entail higher 
minimum wages, incentives for union membership would be reduced. The latter 
argument may have gained additional importance because of the tendency towards 
declining union membership in recent years.  
On the employers’ side, the picture is more mixed. The Confederation of Swedish 
Enterprise (Svenskt Näringsliv), although welcoming the judgment in the Laval case, 
has at time of writing (September 2008) not yet taken a definitive position on its 
implementation. One large member organisation, the Association of Swedish 
Engineering Industries (Teknikföretagen), has called for national minimum wage 
legislation (Weihe 2008). According to their interpretation of the Swedish model, it 
would be an anomaly if employers and unions were to regulate conditions, such as 
minimum wages, for legal entities that are not members of their respective 
organisations. This would go against the idea of voluntary participation. Hence a legal 
minimum wage should be introduced for both foreign and Swedish firms. Another 
member organisation, the Swedish Trade Federation (Svensk Handel), does not see a 
need for legislated minimum wages (Jacobsson 2008). Unlike in the engineering 
industry, no companies enter Sweden on a temporary basis and compete with lower 
wages, and the minimum wage in the collective agreement is already high in relation to 
average wages. For these reasons, the organisation is not pushing for legislation, but 
would not oppose it if both employers and unions supported it.  
Some actions have also been taken by unions and employer organisations in 
response to the Laval conflict and the verdict. A possibility of temporary membership 
of the Swedish Confederation of Enterprise for foreign firms was introduced in 2005, 
through an agreement with LO and the bargaining cartel for non-manual workers 
(Privattjänstemannakartellen, PTK). So far few firms have applied for temporary 
membership. This may be explained by the fact most firms are in the country on a 
short-term basis, which reduces the value of membership. Unions have also tried to    20
recruit members among workers from the new EU countries. These efforts seem not to 
have been particularly successful either, at least as far as construction is concerned 
(Niklasson and Connheim 2008). The short-term nature of the association with the 
Swedish labour market reduces incentives also for union membership. In addition, it is 
conceivable that temporary workers from the new EU member states use a different 
comparison norm for wages than the one used by Swedish unions: the lower wage rates 
in the home countries rather than the higher Swedish wages.  
The Swedish Construction Workers’ Union has, however, gained some success in 
being able to sign more collective agreements with foreign firms employing posted 
workers (as will be discussed in more detail in the next case study). These so-called 
application agreements (hängavtal) can be signed by firms that are not members of an 
employers’ organisation, but are otherwise identical to regular agreements as far as the 
contents are concerned (such as minimum wage rates). However, an important 
difference is that the possibilities are more limited for assuring that the employers 
follow the application agreements, since monitoring is performed by the unions and 
posted workers typically are not members of Swedish unions.  
 
Impacts on collective bargaining in the future   
 
The outcome in the Laval case has also exerted  upward pressure on minimum wages in 
some post-verdict collective agreements and led to the introduction of such rates in 
agreements in which previously no minimum wages have been negotiated. An example 
of the latter is the latest agreement of the Swedish Association of Health Professionals 
(Vårdförbundet), the main union organising registered nurses.
13 The verdict in the 
Laval case and increasing labour mobility in Europe were cited by the trade union 
chair, during negotiations with the employer side, as two of the motivations behind the 
desire to introduce a minimum wage (Eklund 2008). It remains to be seen how 
widespread this practice will become among other unions without minimum wages, 
most of which organise non-manual labour. LO has announced that it may change its 
wage policy, reverting to the old system with tariff wages, as a direct response to the 
Laval verdict (Lundby-Wedin and Olausson 2008).  
Since a majority of the latest and most important agreements for manual workers 
were negotiated in the first half of 2007 – well before the verdict in the Laval case that 
apparently came as a surprise to the unions – it is too early to generalise about the 
impact of the court ruling on collective agreements. But the actions already taken by 
the Swedish Association of Health Professionals and those contemplated by LO clearly 
go against the development of increasing decentralisation of wage formation since the 
1990s.  
 
4.2 Case study 2: In-migration of posted workers: A wage-depressing 
effect? 
 
A discussion of the significance of the Laval case requires information about the 
number of posted workers in Sweden. Unfortunately, such information is very 
incomplete. Migrants to Sweden mainly for labour market reasons (that is, excluding 
students, pensioners and close relatives of migrants with permanent residence permits) 
may enter the country either as individual migrants or as posted workers. The 
traditional type of migrant is the individual worker who seeks job opportunities in 
domestic firms. The posted worker is a relatively new type of migrant who works for a 
                                                 
13 A minimum wage rate was introduced in the three-year agreement for 2008–11, which was preceded by a 
one-month strike. The minimum rate applies to nurses and some other worker categories with at least one 
year’s experience, amounts to SEK 21,100 per month, is in effect from March to December 2009, and is thus 
not permanent (Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions 2008).    21 
firm temporarily operating in the country of destination. Unlike many other EU 
countries, Sweden did not impose restrictive transitional rules for migrants from the 
new member countries in 2004. 
The number of posted workers in Sweden is not known. However, there is some 
information on the number of migrants from the new EU member states. For work 
spells of longer duration than three months registration with the Swedish Migration 
Board (Migrationsverket) is necessary for migrants in accordance with the EES 
agreement. Statistics for the period 2000–07 are presented in Table 4. The figures refer 
to registrations (permits before 2006) for work-related reasons only, that is, for 
‘employees’, ‘self-employed persons’ and ‘consultants’.
14 Data are presented for old 
EU, new EU as well as non-EU countries. These categories could include a number of 
posted workers, but the number of unrecorded cases is probably large.  
 
 
Table 4: Residence permits/registrations in accordance with the EES agreement, for 
labour market reasons, by country of citizenship, 2000–07 
 
 
  2000   2001   2002   2003   2004   2005   2006   2007   2000–07 
 
Old EU  3223  2826  3054  3254  3008  3413  3632  3123  25533 
(excl. Nordic) 
of which 
Germany  912   864   1060  1307  1139  1447  1507  1272  9508 
New EU  0   0   0   2   3714  5202  6489  5761  21168 
of which 
 
Bulgaria        0   0   0   0   338   338 
Czech  
Republic         0   97   187   124   120   528 
Estonia         0   333   344   346   130   1153   
Hungary        0   164   240   348   320   1072 
Latvia        0   247   233   253   139   872 
Lithuania        0   587   796   744   451   2578 
Poland         0   2208   3254   4508   3386   13356 
Romania         2   0   0   0   740   742 
Slovakia         0   61   120   105   114   400 
Slovenia         0   12   17   32   12   73 
 
Non-EU    3   1   20   47   45   56   43   0   215  
All countries   3226   2827   3074   3303   6767   8671   10164  8884   46916 
 
Note: Labour market reasons apply to ‘employees’, ‘self-employed persons’ and ‘consultants’, but exclude 
‘students’, ‘close relatives’ and ‘pensioners’. 
 
Source: Swedish Migration Board. 
 
The main message of the table is that the inflow of migrants is relatively small, but 
there is a clear increase from the new member countries.   The total number of 
registrations is about  47,000 over the whole period, with a strong increase in 
registrations from the new EU countries in 2004 and in subsequent years (and for the 
most recent member countries Bulgaria and Romania in 2007). Poland accounts for 
                                                 
14 Registrations for ‘students’, ‘close relatives’ and ‘pensioners’ have thus been excluded. While it cannot be 
ruled out that some persons in these categories are also working while in Sweden, it seems less likely that a 
large proportion of them are posted workers.     22
about two thirds of the registrations from the new member countries. Registrations for 
the old EU members, with Germany as the main country of citizenship, have remained 
at a fairly stable level during the period.  
It should be kept in mind that the number of posted workers may well be higher than 
the figures for individual migrants in Table 4. If so,  labour migration to Sweden would 
thus mainly occur through the Posted Workers’ Directive rather than through individual 
migration.
15 In addition, there is likely to be an unknown number of illegal workers 
residing in the country. The Swedish Construction Workers’ Union estimates that there 
are 10,000 foreign workers in construction alone (Niklasson and Connheim 2008), out 
of about 290,000 employees  in this sector (in 2007).  
 
 
A  shift to self-employment? 
 
A potential response to high minimum wage levels in the collective agreements or an 
increase in the monitoring of foreign firms’ wage practices by unions may be to switch 
from regular employment to self-employment. No wage regulations apply to the latter 
category of workers. However, Table 5 shows that registrations for self-employment 
account for less than 5 per cent of all registrations for labour market reasons, and the 
share is not higher among citizens from the new EU member countries than for citizens 
from the old EU countries. Thus, there is little evidence, so far, of a shift to more self-
employment as a response to high wage levels in Sweden.  
 
 
Table 5: Residence permits/registrations in accordance with the EES agreement for 
self-employment, relative to permits/registrations for all labour market reasons, by 
country of citizenship, 2000–7 (%) 
 
  2000   2001   2002   2003   2004   2005   2006   2007   2000–7 
 
Old EU  
 (excl.   
  Nordic)   3.4   2.6   3.7   4.1   4.7   5.8   5.0   5.0   4.3 
New EU           3.6   6.2   4.2   4.9   4.8 
All countries   3.4   2.6   3.7   4.0   4.1   6.0   4.5   5.0   4.5 
 
Note and source: See Table 4. 
 
Collective agreements with foreign firms 
 
Another way of shedding light on the migration of posted workers is to consider the 
number of collective agreements that Swedish unions have signed with foreign 
companies operating in Sweden on a temporary basis. These firms are likely to employ 
posted workers, mainly from the country of origin. An overwhelming majority of the 
agreements are application agreements,, as mentioned previously, which apply to firms, 
regardless of nationality, that are not members of a Swedish wage-negotiating 
employer organisation. These agreements are basically identical to the regular 
agreement for member firms. A small number of agreements are also made with 
foreign companies with temporary membership of an employer organisation.  
I have chosen to examine more closely the number of collective agreements in the 
construction sector, where many posted workers are active. The data cover agreements 
                                                 
15 Dølvik and Eldring (2008) argue that the inflow of posted workers is greater than the inflow of 
individual labour migrants in all Nordic countries.     23 
with the Swedish Construction Workers’ Union during 2000–07. Most of the foreign 
companies in this industry are small and act as sub-contractors in large construction 
projects. The firms in the data typically operate in Sweden for about a year, but there is 
a great deal of variation.
16 A drawback with the data is that they refer to the number of 
agreements and do not contain information on the number of workers involved. 




Significant arrival of firms from new EU member states 
 
Table 6 shows the number of collective agreements in the construction industry, by 
enterprise country of origin. The main conclusion from the table is that the number of 
firms from new EU countries has increased since 2004, but that this also holds for an 
old EU country such as Germany, as well as for Sweden. While the overall increase in 
agreements reflects the boom in the construction sector over the period, it is also seems 
to be more competition from low-wage countries in the construction industry than 
before. The new member country with most agreements is Poland, with about half of 
all agreements for firms from these countries. The agreements with foreign companies 
are still few in relation to those for firms permanently operating in Sweden (about 6 per 
cent of the total in 2007).  
 
Distance is important for location choices 
 
The regional distribution is presented in Table 7 for Sweden and the three foreign 
countries with most agreements, namely Germany, Poland and Estonia. The regional 
division corresponds to the 25 regional offices of the Swedish Construction Workers’ 
Union that sign agreements with foreign companies operating temporarily in Sweden. 
For brevity’s sake, only the five regions with most agreements are shown for each 
country. Agreements with German firms are concentrated in the southern parts of 
Sweden, while most Estonian agreements are to be found in Stockholm and 
neighbouring areas. Distance from the host country thus seems to be important; a short 
road distance in terms of kilometres or hours’ driving is on the whole associated with 
more agreements in the region for each country. The economic size of the region (as 




                                                 
16 All foreign companies with posted workers do not sign agreements – Laval is a case in point – and it is 
probable that firms with very short spells in Sweden are underrepresented among firms with agreements. In 
addition, some agreements in the construction sector are signed by staffing agencies and these agreements 
may be difficult to assign to a specific industry. 
17 The region of the agreement refers to the region in which the firm was first active. Some firms may 
subsequently have extended their operations also to other regions, but these activities are not covered by the 
data.  
18 The findings regarding distance and economic size are in line with the predictions of the ‘gravity model’ of 
international trade (see, for example, Deardorff 1998).    24
Table 6: Collective agreements between the Swedish Construction Workers’ Union 
and construction firms, by country of origin, 2000–07 
 
  2000   2001   2002   2003   2004   2005   2006   2007   2000–07 
 
Nordic  
  Countries  9   9   13   26   24   27   29   13   150 
 of  which: 
  Denmark  2   2   3   10   5   7   5   0   34 
  Finland  4   5   5   8   13   18   17   8   78 
  Norway  3   2   5   8   6   2   7   5   38 
Old EU  
 (excl.   
  Nordic)   2   8   9   52   45   39   47   64   266 
 of which 
 Germany  2   3   7   48   38   26   45   54   223 
New EU  3   1   3   10   41   51   75   58   242 
 of  which: 
 Czech   
  Republic  0   0   0   0   2   1   1   2   6 
  Estonia  0   0   1   5   3   11   14   9   43 
  Hungary  3   1   0   0   1   4   3   4   16 
  Latvia  0   0   1   1   3   3   3   5   16 
  Lithuania  0   0   0   0   5   3   8   4   20 
  Poland  0   0   1   2   25   28   40   28   124 
  Romania  0   0   0   0   0   1   4   1   6 
  Slovakia  0   0   0   2   2   0   2   5   11 
Non-EU  0   0   1   0   1   2   7   0   11 
All foreign  
  countries  14   18   26   88   111   119   158   135   669  
Sweden  982   1191   1373   1585   1866   2263   2197   2194   13651 
 
Note: Figures for foreign countries refer to application agreements related to the Swedish Construction 
Agreement, applicable to firms that are not members of the Swedish Construction Federation and the 
Swedish Confederation of Enterprise, and (a small number of) agreements signed by firms with temporary 
membership. Figures for Sweden refer to regular and application agreements and include a small number of 
agreements signed by foreign-owned firms that are operating in Sweden on a permanent basis.  
 





Until recently, the domestic construction sector has largely been shielded from 
international competition.
19 It is clearly possible that the increased competition since 
2004, especially from low-wage countries, has decreased wage pressure in the industry 
as a whole. There is no systematic information about posted workers’ wages, but they 
are likely to be lower than wages in Swedish firms, at least in firms from new member 
states. In general, worker skills and productivity levels in the latter firms are expected 
to be relatively low and they may also be more labour intensive than domestic firms. 
Although the inflow of foreign workers is not very large, the mere possibility of 
employers using their services may have contributed to wage restraint among Swedish 
workers. 
                                                 
19 According to the Swedish Competition Authority (Konkurrensverket), the sector is characterised by the 
dominance of a few large companies, cartelisation among certain firms, slow technological development and 
widespread use of workers who do not declare their earnings (Swedish Competition Authority 2008).    25 
Table 7: Collective agreements between the Swedish Construction Workers’ Union 
and construction firms from various countries, by top 5 Swedish regions, and road 
distance from capital of respective country to region, 2000–07 
 
   Agreements  Road  distance 
      from capital  
     Km    Hours 
 
Germany 
 all 25 regions  202 
 of which 
  1. Malmö  73   471   6:11 
  2. Halmstad  32   607   7:32 
  3. Väst   19   817   10:02 
  4. Helsingborg  11   536   6:50 
  5. Stockholm  9   1075   12:15 
Poland  
all 25 regions  117 
  of which  
  1. Stockholm   24   1603   19:08 
  2. Malmö   21   1049   12:51 
  3. Gothenburg   16   1319   15:30 
  4. Väst  9   1395   16:43 
  5. Värmland   6   1581   19:04 
Estonia  
  all 25 regions  43 
 of  which 
  1. Stockholm  19   480   12:07 
  2. Uppland   6   483   12:22 
  3. Borås  2   886   16:35 
  3. Luleå  2   952   14:13 
  3. Värmland    2   770   15:34 
  3. Väst  2   877   17:07 
Sweden  
  all 25 regions  13651 
  of which  
 1.  Stockholm    2675 
 2.  Gothenburg  1145 
 3.  Malmö    961 
 4.  Helsingborg    766 
 5.  Väst  698 
  
Note: Road distance includes routes covered by passenger vessels. The total number of agreements for 
Germany, Poland and Estonia differs from the total in Table 6 since not all agreements could be assigned to a 
specific region. See also note to Table 6. 
 
Source: Swedish Construction Workers’ Union (agreements), Google Maps (road distance). 
 
  
In order to examine the wage effects on Swedish workers in construction Table 8 
presents GLS regressions for an extended ‘wage curve’ for 25 regions over the period 
2001–07. Such a regression basically relates the real wage level to the unemployment 
rate, with a negative coefficient expected for the latter variable (see Blanchflower and 
Oswald 1995). The specification in the table adds the number of foreign agreements as 
explanatory variables (with the Swedish agreements as a control for size of region), the 
idea being that foreign agreements in relation to domestic ones serve as a proxy for the 
unobserved ‘market penetration’ of foreign firms in construction. All data are 
aggregated at the regional level and the wage and unemployment variables refer to 
union members in construction. The chosen wage measure is hourly piece-rates, which    26
are negotiated for all new construction and thus should be more sensitive to 
fluctuations in demand and foreign competition than time-based pay. Some 
specifications add year and region dummies in order to control for macroeconomic and 
local conditions, respectively.  
 
 
Table 8: Random-effects GLS (RE) and fixed-effects (FE) estimations, 2001–07 
(dependent variable: Real log hourly wage for Swedish construction workers) 
 
    (1)   (2)   (3)  
    RE   RE   FE 
 
Log hourly  
  wage, lagged  .9306***   .8730***   .3934*** 
    (.0279)   (.0434)   (.0992) 
Number of  
 agreements:   
– New EU  0004   –.0002   .0003 
    (.0001)   (.0005)   (.0005) 
– Old EU and  
  non-EU  .0001   .0001   .0006 
    (.0003)   (.0004)   (.0004) 
– Sweden   .0000   .0000   –.0001 
    (.0000)   (.0000)   (.0001) 
Log unemploy-  
  ment rate  –.0057   –.0039   –.0176** 
    (.0036)   (.0043)   (.0085) 
Year dummies   No   Yes   Yes 
Region dummies   No   No   Yes 
Overall R2  .889   .897   .790  
 
Note: There are 175 observations in all regressions. The constant is not reported. Robust standard errors (RE) 
within parentheses *** significance at 1 per cent level; ** 5 per cent; * 10 per cent.  
 
Source: Own calculations, based on data from the Swedish Construction Workers’ Union. 
 
 
As expected, the unemployment rate (for members of the unemployment insurance 
fund in construction) comes out with a negative (and small) coefficient in Table 8, 
though only significantly so in the specification with both year and region dummies in 
column (3). More importantly, the number of agreements with companies from new (or 
old) EU member countries does not seem to matter for Swedish wages The strongest 
determinant is wages in the previous period, as indicated by the significant coefficient 
for the lagged dependent variable.  
Using the number of agreements as a proxy for the inflow of foreign workers is a 
crude measure, as already pointed out, and mismeasurement of this variable should bias 
the effects of the agreements towards zero. Another potential problem with the 
regressions is reverse causation, which holds if the decision to locate in a specific 
region depends on the wage level. If a high wage level in a region attracts foreign 
firms, because it either reflects a high level of demand or signals a lack of competition 
that can be exploited, the effect from increased foreign competition on Swedish wages 
will be underestimated. With reverse causation and measurement errors, the true effect 
could be identified by using instruments that affect the foreign firms’ decision to locate 
in the region, but not Swedish wages.  
To this end, experiments were carried out with G2SLS IV estimations for two 
countries, Germany and Poland, with the road distance in hours (which worked better 
than kilometres) and a dummy for the post-enlargement period 2004–7 as instruments    27 
for the foreign agreements. The first-stage regressions show that distance has a 
negative effect on the number of agreements, while the dummy is positive and 
significant for Poland only (see Table 9). The size of the market (the number of 
Swedish agreements) also attracts firms from both countries. However, the IV 
estimations in Table 10 do not change the previous results that foreign agreements have 




Table 9: First-stage random-effects GLS (RE) regressions, 2001–07 (dependent 
variable: Number of collective agreements for German or Polish firms in the Swedish 
construction sector) 
 
   (1)    (2)   
   Germany    Poland   
   RE    RE   
 
Road distance in hours  
  – Berlin  – .2594
**    
   (.0589)     
 –  Warsaw    –.0881
***  
     (.0229)   
Dummy for 2004-07   – .5361   1.5188
**   
   (1.2303)    (.4274)   
Log hourly wage, lagged  –1.9799
   –2.5328    
   (5.8788)    (2.0363)   
Number of agreements  
 –  Sweden  .0083
**   .0125
***  
    (.0035)   (.0012)    
Log unemployment rate  .7470   .6359
**    
   (.7779)    (.2655)   
Year dummies  Yes  Yes 
P-value (Wald)   .000   .000  
 
Note: All regressions include a constant. See also note to Table 8. 
 
Source: Own calculations, based on data from the Swedish Construction Workers’ Union and Google Maps. 
 
 
The results point to the conclusion that low-wage competition from new EU 
member states has not depressed Swedish wages in construction. This may be because 
the inflow of workers has been too small to have much of an effect or  because the 
boom in the industry since 2004 has concealed the effect (in a way that is not captured 
by controlling for economy-wide conditions in the regressions).
21 There is a caveat, 
however. The number of foreign workers could be too poorly measured and regional 
aggregation may hide effects in certain regions that would be possible to detect only 
with individual, and as of yet unavailable, wage data.  
                                                 
20 Unfortunately, it was not possible to find region-specific instruments that vary over time, so the 
regressions in Tables 8–9 do not allow for separate region-specific effects.  
21 A number of unreported robustness checks for the results in Table 8 were performed. These checks include 
GMM estimation, AR(1) estimation, inclusion of a trend, interacting the number of agreements with 
dummies for specific regions, deleting the lagged dependent variable and using time-based pay as the 
dependent variable. The results for the agreements remained basically unchanged.     28
Table 10: Random-effects GLS (RE) and random-effects G2SLS IV regressions (RE-
IV), 2001–07 (dependent variable: Real log hourly wage for Swedish construction 
workers) 
 
     (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)  
    RE   RE-IV   RE   RE- IV  
 
Number of  
 agreements   
  – Germany  – .0001   –.0009
       
    (.0004)   (.0016)        
  – Poland       –.0005   –.0042  
       (.0011)    (.0054) 
    
Overall R
2  .897   .895   .897   .893  
 
Note: All regressions include a constant, log hourly wage (lagged), number of agreements for Sweden, log 
unemployment rate and year dummies. The IV estimations also include road distances in hours to Berlin 
(regression 2) and Warsaw (regression 4) and a dummy for the period 2004–07 as instruments. See also note 
to Table 8. 
 





Minimum wages in Sweden are negotiated in collective agreements and not regulated 
by law as is the case in most other countries. Nor are the rates legally extended to 
uncovered sectors as in Finland and Norway. The rates, which are differentiated by 
industry, are among the highest in the world in relation to average wages and have 
increased substantially since 1995 in most sectors. Minimum wages matter most in 
service sectors, such as retail and hotels/restaurants. The minimum wage policy in 
Sweden has contributed to the fact that few workers earn low wages and the virtual 
absence of the ‘working poor’ phenomenon. Minimum wages should also help explain 
why wage dispersion is relatively low compared to other countries. But success in these 
respects seems also to have come at a price in the form of lower employment among 
the young and the unskilled, although there is some uncertainty as regards the size of 
the disemployment effects.   
The Laval case, which concerned construction workers posted by a Latvian 
company in Sweden, is the first of its kind in post-enlargement EU. The case poses 
specific challenges to the Swedish model of minimum wages. The European Court of 
Justice ruled that the minimum wages in construction were not clearly defined and 
some modification of the model will be necessary.  
Up to now, the impact on the Swedish labour market of the inflow of posted workers 
has probably been limited. In construction, the increased inflow of foreign workers 
seems not to have affected Swedish wages negatively. To the extent that posted 
workers and domestic, underground workers who do not declare their earnings are 
substitutes in construction, the main brunt from increasing foreign competition may 
instead have been borne by the latter category, Nor do available data suggest that self-
employment has been used as a device to avoid minimum wage regulation to any large 
extent.  
Nevertheless, the significance of the Laval case is likely to increase in the future, for 
a number of reasons. First, the inflow of posted workers may well spread to other 
industries previously shielded from international competition. There is great potential 
for low-wage competition from new EU members in services, since the wage share is 
much higher than in industries such as construction. The posted service workers may 
be employed by staffing agencies operating in Sweden. Second, it is not hard to think    29 
of a number of difficulties with regulating and monitoring minimum wages for posted 
workers from the new member states, regardless of how these rates are determined. 
Even if the foreign companies sign collective agreements, as many have done, it is 
difficult for the unions to get confirmation of the wage levels that the firms are obliged 
to report since there are no union members in the firms (Jacobsson, 2007). Should 
monitoring become more effective, increasing self-employment, a worker category for 
which no wage regulations apply, may be the response.  
In the Swedish debate, it is frequently overlooked that creating ‘equal minimum 
standards’ is quite different from creating ‘equal terms’ in the sense that wages should 
be equal in foreign and Swedish firms. The latter notion is ill suited to a context where 
foreign firms with posted workers differ very much from Swedish firms in terms of 
worker skills, productivity and capital intensity.   If anything, the Swedish experience 
with posted workers points to the importance of having clearly defined and all-
encompassing minimum wages – the model needs to be modified in this respect. The 
two main alternatives are a national minimum wage and legal extension to uncovered 
sectors. 
  A clear advantage with a legislated minimum wage is that it is indeed all-
encompassing, since the law would cover both foreign firms with posted workers and 
Swedish firms without collective agreements. It is difficult to envisage a sustainable 
solution to the difficulties associated with the Laval case without a regulatory 
framework that treats these two types of firms in the same way. A statutory minimum 
wage would probably entail lower rates than those in the collective agreements. This 
need not be a drawback, however, since much of the research points to disemployment 
effects of the currently prevailing, collectively agreed rates.  A more serious question 
mark is perhaps related to the idea of political interference in wage formation, as there 
is a distinct risk of minimum wage levels becoming issues in national election 
campaigns for short-run political gains. By creating an independent government body, 
like the Low Pay Commission in the United Kingdom, with representatives of unions, 
employers and researchers, a more long-term perspective to minimum wage issues 
could be achieved.    
  Extension of collective agreements to uncovered sectors could also potentially 
create a level playing field, in terms of minimum standards, for foreign firms with 
posted workers and Swedish firms, with or without collective agreements. But the 
sustainability of this approach is questionable. Should union membership continue to 
decline, a situation may arise where the legislator cannot consider the collective 
agreements to be representative enough for the industries concerned.  Although not an 
immediate concern in Sweden, this seems already to be looming in the future for 
Finland, where extensions have been used widely and union membership in some 
industries is nearing the critical 50 per cent mark (Böckerman and Uusitalo 2006). 
Unionisation rates also tend to be lower in services, where the role of minimum wages 
for pushing up the lowest wages is relatively more important. In addition, the 
possibilities for workers to free-ride on union benefits through legal extensions of 
collective agreements to uncovered sectors create disincentives for union membership, 
which could reduce membership even further.   
As should be evident from this report, striking a balance between safeguarding 
domestic wage levels and reaping the benefits from the possibilities for companies to 
offer their services across the whole EU will not be an easy task.  
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